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IPL-M1 interaction shapes pre-
reflective social differentiation 
in the human action system: 
new insights from TBS and TMS 
combined
Luca F. Ticini  1, Thomas Dolk2, Florian Waszak3 & Simone Schütz-Bosbach4
The conscious experience of being the author of our own actions is thought to be grounded in pre-
reflective and low-level sensorimotor representations of the self as different from the other. It has been 
suggested that the inferior parietal lobe (IPL) is generally involved in self-other differentiation processes 
and in providing an explicit sense of action authorship. However, direct evidence for its causal and 
functional role in distinguishing self-related and other-related sensorimotor representations is lacking. 
The current study employed theta-burst stimulation (TBS) to condition left IPL’s activity before a social 
version of the rubber hand illusion led participants to illusorily attribute observed finger movements to 
their own body. We recorded motor evoked potentials to single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation 
over the primary motor cortex (M1) as proxies of action authorship during action observation. The 
results showed that in a control condition (intermediate TBS over the left IPL) others’ actions facilitated 
whereas self-attributed movements inhibited the motor system. Critically, continuous TBS disrupted 
this mismatch between self and other representations. This outcome provides direct evidence for the 
IPL’s role in providing fundamental authorship signals for social differentiation in the human action 
system.
A central debate in the investigation of human behaviour concerns the origins of subjective action states, such as 
the daily effortless experience of being the author of one’s own movements. Indeed, how and where in the brain 
this experience is formed and which neural computations support it are still not fully understood. Studies in 
experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience have identified a number of distinct dimensions and indica-
tors of human selfhood. On the one hand, a conceptual and reflective form of agency and authorship experience is 
thought to rely on complex processes of belief formation (see1–5). On the other hand, a pre-reflective sensorimotor 
experience of action authorship — the subject of the present work — is thought to be automatically generated by 
primary processes of perception-action coupling6,7. This hypothesis goes back to classical motor control theories 
proposing that during self-generated movements, the brain would compare the efferent copy8 of the executed 
motor command with the sensory consequences of the action6,7,9. A strong correspondence between the two is 
associated with the experience that events are self-generated1,10, whilst a discrepancy informs the brain that an 
action is executed by another agent. These by-products of bodily activity are constantly present and may explain 
why our sense of self persists (the so-called minimal self11) even when we are not engaged in explicit reflection 
and monitoring of movements.
Previously, Schütz-Bosbach and colleagues12,13 characterised the proxy measures of this low-level experi-
ence of action authorship in the human motor system. In their work, they combined single-pulse transcranial 
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magnetic stimulation (spTMS) with a social version of the ‘rubber hand illusion’ (RHI14). During the RHI, the 
participants observed a model abducting the right index finger while their own hand was hidden from view. 
The dorsal surface of the model’s (observed) and of the participant’s (occluded) right index fingers were stim-
ulated by either synchronous or asynchronous brush-stroking delivered by two identical small paintbrushes. A 
successful RHI manipulation resulted in the participant’s experience of ownership of the actions of the model’s 
hand during synchronous stroking, as assessed through a questionnaire14. Therefore, the RHI allowed to compare 
action authorship when movements, which were physically equivalent, were either illusorily attributed or not 
attributed to the self12. As a sensorimotor marker of action authorship, Schütz-Bosbach and colleagues recorded 
spTMS-induced motor evoked potentials (MEP) triggered by action observation in the peripheral right hand 
muscles of the index (involved in the observed action) and little (control) fingers. The results showed that the 
motor system differentiates between self- and other-attributed actions: while the observation of actions linked to 
another individual facilitated the motor system, following a mirror-matching mechanism (see also15), the obser-
vation of actions attributed to the self inhibited it (see13).
However, the question of which neurophysiological mechanisms shape these sensorimotor markers of action 
authorship still remains unanswered. The current study aimed to address this issue by specifically testing the 
functional contribution of the inferior parietal lobe (IPL).
At a cognitive level, this cortical structure is known to play a key role in the explicit attribution of actions 
to their agents as well as in the awareness of ones’ own movement execution16–20 (for a review, see21,22), and in 
self-other differentiation23–25. Moreover, computational models26,27 and brain imaging research suggest that this 
area works as a comparator mechanism (see also1,27–29) shaping the feeling of control and causation over an action 
(the feeling of ‘agency’; e.g.30–34) when the predicted and actual sensory consequences of the action correspond.
To date, it is unclear whether the IPL exerts an influence on the pre-reflective experience of action authorship, 
as measured in the experiments of Schütz-Bosbach and colleagues12,13. Two recent studies support the idea that 
the IPL is directly involved in processing self-related actions at a sensorimotor level. The first study35 showed 
that, during an imitation-inhibition task, facilitation of the right IPL by means of anodal transcranial alternating 
current stimulation (tDCS) enhanced self-related motor representations measured as spTMS-induced MEPs. The 
second study36 investigated with electroencephalography the motor responses to the observation of hand move-
ments. The result showed that alternating (disruptive) tDCS of the left IPL reduced the activation of self-related 
motor processes during the observation of hand movements from an egocentric (but not allocentric) viewpoint.
We therefore hypothesised that, if IPL is indeed involved in shaping action authorship at a sensorimotor level, 
its transient distribution would alter the pattern of MEPs as measured by Schütz-Bosbach and colleagues12. In 
particular, we reasoned that left IPL interference might drop the known inhibitory effects of the IPL on the ipsi-
lateral primary motor cortex37, which are likely associated with intra-cortical inhibition and reduced facilitation 
measured for self-owned actions during the RHI13.
To test this, we interfered with IPL’s activity (as a marker of action authorship) before recording amplitude 
variations of MEPs evoked by applying spTMS to the ipsilateral left primary motor cortex. We targeted the left 
IPL with trains of offline noninvasive continuous theta-burst-stimulation (cTBS38), an established tool to directly 
test the functional role of brain areas in cognitive processes. In a within-subjects design, we applied intermediate 
TBS (imTBS) as a control condition to the same area, as it is known to produce no significant excitability changes 
in the cortex38–40. After brain stimulation and during the recordings of MEPs, participants observed the hand of 
a human model performing abductions with the contralateral right index finger. By means of the RHI14, the hand 
performing these actions was illusorily attributed to the self (during synchronous brush-stroking) or to the model 
(during asynchronous stroking12,13). Summing up, in this study we measured variations of MEP amplitudes trig-
gered by action observation when the perceived movements were execute by a hand attributed to the self or to the 
other, in conditions in which interferential brain stimulation was or was not applied over the left IPL.
In the control condition (i.e. imTBS), we expected to record smaller MEP amplitudes when the observed 
actions were illusorily linked to the self (during synchronous stroking) as compared to MEPs associated with 
actions attributed to another individual (during asynchronous stroking12,13). After cTBS, we expected this 
self-other differentiation to disappear. This result would indicate that action authorship was lost after disruptive 
stimulation of IPL thereby supporting a causal role of parietal neural computations in shaping action attribution 
at the sensorimotor level.
Materials and Methods
Participants. Sixteen female subjects (26.4 ± 4.3 years old) with no neurological history participated in the 
study. We determined the required sample size through the G* power software41 by setting the expected effect size 
at 0.41 (estimated from13), the significance level at 0.05, and the desired power at 0.95. All participants had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision. They were right-handed as assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory42 
and naïve with regard to the purpose of the study. The protocol was approved by the ethic committee of the 
University of Leipzig and written informed consent was requested. The research was performed in accordance 
with relevant safety guidelines43.
Procedure and experimental design. The experiment followed a within-participants design, with 
the independent variables STROKING (“Synchronous/Self ”, during synchronous stroking, see below, vs. 
“Asynchronous/Other”, during asynchronous stroking) and TBS (cTBS vs. imTBS). STROKING and TBS were 
blocked and the order of blocks was counterbalanced across participants (Table 1). Each subject participated to 
the experiment twice, in two sessions (1st and 2nd day) of either cTBS or imTBS, separated by 7.1 ± 0.77 days.
The rubber hand illusion. We used a modified version of the RHI, as described by Schütz-Bosbach et al.12, in 
which the participants illusorily attribute (or not) the hand of a model (a human experimenter) to their own 
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body. As the model was a female and to maintain constant the experimental settings of the RHI (see also below) 
we chose participants of the same gender. Participants sat in a sound-attenuated dimly lit room keeping their 
right hand in a pronated position, hidden from view inside a box. They were asked to observe the right hand of 
the model, sitting on their left side (index-to-index fixed distance of 23 cm44), under a surface mounted on top 
of the box that appeared either as a mirror or as transparent glass, according to computer-controlled illumina-
tion. The dorsal surface of the model’s (observed) and of the participant’s (occluded) right index fingers were 
stimulated with either synchronously or asynchronously stroking, by two identical small paintbrushes mounted 
on computer-controlled motors (Fig. 1). Both stroke types were of identical duration. Only during synchronous 
stroking, the strokes applied on the model and on the participant had identical time onset, speed, duration and 
direction of tactile simulation (from the knuckle to the fingertip or vice-versa). To avoid habituation, strokes’ 
direction and speed were kept unpredictable by random changes every three seconds. Previous studies showed 
that only synchronous stroking (i.e., congruent visual and tactile stimulation) induces in participants the feel-
ing that the model’s hand belongs to their own body14,45,46. The RHI also keeps the experience of the observed 
hand identical with respect to viewpoint, morphological features, proprioceptive information and kinaesthetic 
experience.
In an Induction Block (Fig. 1) the participants observed the model’s relaxed hand, while either synchronous 
or asynchronous stokes were delivered for three minutes. In a subsequent Experimental Block (EB), one minute 
of either synchronous or asynchronous stroking was followed by short unpredictable periods of action observa-
tion trials (N = 20) in which the participants observed the abduction of the model’s right index finger, while the 
stroking was stopped (a GO signal was delivered to the model via headphones, and was the last of three auditory 
signals at 1 Hz). These trials alternated with short periods of stroking (randomised between 4 and 7 seconds).
Measures of Body Ownership. When stroking was absent, before and after IB and EB, the surface covering the 
model’s hand appeared as a mirror (hence the hand was occluded) and the proprioceptive drift measure was 
taken. The proprioceptive drift indicates quantitatively the displacement of the participant’s felt hand position 
towards the model’s hand. The participants verbally indicated the perceived location of their right index finger 
based on the numbers depicted on a ruler reflected on the mirror surface (for more details, see46). To avoid 
response bias, the ruler was always presented with a random offset. After IB and EB, a questionnaire, shortened 
Group
1st day 2nd day
TBS 
stimulation
Induction Block 
(begins with)
Experimental Block 
(begins with)
TBS 
stimulation
Induction Block 
(begins with)
Experimental Block 
(begins with)
1 imTBS Synchronous Asynchronous cTBS Synchronous Asynchronous
2 imTBS Asynchronous Synchronous cTBS Asynchronous Synchronous
3 cTBS Synchronous Asynchronous imTBS Synchronous Asynchronous
4 cTBS Asynchronous Synchronous imTBS Asynchronous Synchronous
Table 1. Balancing of the experimental sessions per group of participants.
Figure 1. Illustration of the Experiment. Targeting the left inferior parietal lobe (IPL), each of the two days 
started with the application of either continuous theta-burst stimulation (cTBS) or intermediate (im)TBS (order 
counterbalanced across participants). In the following Induction and Experimental Blocks, the Rubber Hand 
Illusion was induced as a consequence of synchronous as compared to asynchronous stroking. The successful 
induction of the illusion was qualified by proprioceptive measurements prior and after the each block and by an 
ownership questionnaire after them. In the Experimental Block, participants observed abductions of a model’s 
right index finger that was illusorily attributed to themselves in the synchronous condition or to the model 
after asynchronous stroking. At the same time, spTMS-induced MEPs from the right index and the little (i.e., 
control) finger were recorded. This setup allowed to investigate the modulations of the observer’s motor cortex 
associated with the observation of actions attributed to the self or to another individual.
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and translated into a German version of the official RHI questionnaire14, assessed ownership of the observed 
hand. The participants rated the strength of agreement or disagreement with 4 statements: (1) ‘It seemed as if 
I was feeling the touch of the paintbrush in the location where I saw the other person’s hand touched’; (2) ‘It 
seemed as if the touch I felt was caused by the paintbrush touching the other person’s hand’; (3) ‘I felt as if he other 
person’s hand was my hand’. A further statement assessed potential agency experience: (4) ‘I had the feeling to 
be in control of the other hand’. The rating was conducted on a visual analogue scale from left (0 = ‘completely 
disagree’) to right (10 = ‘completely agree’). Higher agreement would indicate that the participants experienced 
the RHI (statements 1 to 3) and felt to be the agent of the observed finger’s abduction (statement 4).
Transcranial magnetic stimulation. Theta-burst-stimulation. At the beginning of each day of record-
ings, we applied TBS (either cTBS or imTBS38) to the EEG-marker position Cp5 (see47). Although stereotaxic 
positioning of the TMS coil provides better accuracy than EEG-guided TMS47,48, the 10–20 system is also exten-
sively used. According to Herwig et al.49, Cp5 stimulation targets the left IPL, comprising the supramarginal (BA 
40) and adjacent angular (BA 39) gyri50. We applied either cTBS or imTBS as they are known to have different 
effects on corticospinal excitability: it is believed that cTBS suppresses corticospinal excitability51 whilst imTBS 
produces no excitability changes, thereby it is considered as a reliable control stimulation38. Compared to other 
brain stimulation paradigms, such as 1 Hz repetitive TMS, TBS uses relatively low intensities and it is therefore 
more tolerated. Moreover, cTBS effects last longer (approx. 30 min.) compared to standard 1 Hz stimulation52. 
In our experiment, TBS was delivered through an air-cooled figure-of-eight coil of 70 cm diameter attached to 
a Magstim Rapid2 stimulator (The Magstim Company Ltd, Whitland, U.K.). The stimulation pattern consisted 
of bursts of three pulses at 50 Hz (20 ms between each pulse), which were repeatedly delivered every 200 ms (i.e., 
5 Hz). In cTBS, a train of TBS was delivered without interruption for 40 s (for a total of 600 pulses). In imTBS, a 
5 seconds train of TBS was repeated every 15 seconds for a total of 600 pulses. To comply with the original study 
of Huang et al.38 and safety standards43, the stimulus intensity was set at 80% of the active motor threshold (aMT) 
(mean of maximal stimulator output: 43.1 ± 4.7% in the first day and 43.6 ± 6.8% in second day). The aMT is 
defined as the minimum stimulation intensity that can elicit MEPs larger than 200 µV in at least 5 of 10 successive 
trials during a grip-force measurement with 20% of the maximum force of the contralateral hand. The angle of the 
coil was kept perpendicular to the underlying gyrus with the handle pointing upward and supported manually. 
No particular discomfort or other negative side-effects were reported.
spTMS and electromyographic recordings. Fast and focal measurements of corticospinal excitability (MEPs) 
were obtained during EB by using spTMS while participants observed the model’s right index finger abductions. 
spTMS was randomly delivered between 300 and 500 ms from the onset of the GO signal (see above) by a 70 mm 
figure-of-eight stimulation coil connected to a Magstim 200 magnetic stimulator. The coil was positioned tan-
gentially over participants’ left primary motor cortex with the handle oriented backward and laterally 45° away 
from the midline approximately perpendicular to the central sulcus. For each action observation trial (N = 20), 
we simultaneously recorded spTMS-elicited MEPs from the participants’ abductors of the right index (first dorsal 
interosseous; FDI) and of the right little (abductor digiti minimi; ADM) fingers by using self-adhesive disposable 
Ag–AgCl surface electrodes. A ground 1.5 cm metal electrode was placed on the dorsal surface of the wrist. The 
electrodes were on both the model’s and participant’s hands but the signal was recorded only from the partici-
pant’s muscles. The EMG was amplified 1000 times, digitized at 5 kHz, and band-pass filtered (between 10 and 
1000 Hz) with a mains hum notch filter at 50 Hz. The optimal scalp position from which MEPs with maximal 
amplitude were elicited in both resting FDI and ADM muscles was detected by moving the coil over the left motor 
cortex while delivering TMS pulses at constant intensity. The stimulus intensity employed for spTMS stimula-
tion was set at 120% of each subject’s resting motor threshold (rMT) (mean of maximal stimulator output: rMT 
75.7 ± 7.9% in the first day and 75.2 ± 8.1 in the 2nd day). The rMT is defined as the lowest stimulator output 
that evokes at least five of ten successive MEPs with amplitude greater than 50 μV in the relaxed FDI and ADM 
muscles.
Analysis. The Skewness and Kurtosis values of the data (except the Kurtosis of the proprioceptive drift in the 
cTBS Synchronous condition in EB) were within the limits of ± 2 considered acceptable in order to prove normal 
univariate distribution53.
Behavioural data. To assess the proprioceptive drift, we first computed the difference between the objective 
and the subjective localisation of the participant’s index finger. Then, we subtracted the measure obtained before 
from that obtained after each condition to obtain the proprioceptive drift. The conditions were the following: TBS 
(cTBS and imTBS), BLOCK (IB and EB) and STROKING (Synchronous/Self and Asynchronous/Other). The 
resulting data were submitted to a non-parametric Friedman ANOVA.
The mean agreement ratings to each of the first three statements in the RHI questionnaire were entered into 
a multivariate analysis of variances (MANOVA) with the within-participants variable TBS and STROKING, 
BLOCK and the three questionnaire items assessing the experience of ownership over the model’s hand as 
dependent variables. We run a further repeated measure ANOVA on the agency question (statement 4) with the 
within-participants factors TBS and STROKING.
Neurophysiological data. Individual peak-to-peak MEP amplitudes were calculated as the absolute distance 
between the minimum and maximum values observed within a search window starting at 10 msec and ending at 
80 msec after the TMS pulse. We discarded outliers (with values exceeding 2.5 standard deviations from the mean 
values of each participant, muscle and TBS condition12) for both the background EMG activity (in the 100 ms 
preceding the TMS pulse) and the MEP amplitudes: 4.4% of trials were excluded in the FDI and 4.3% in the 
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ADM. The remaining MEP values were normalised by calculating the natural logarithm of the facilitation ratio 
(MEP amplitudes recorded from the FDI / MEP amplitudes recorded from the ADM) and outliers were excluded 
(1%). The overall number of excluded trials did not differ across conditions (oneway ANOVA F < 1; p = 0.6). The 
average number of trials in each condition was 17.9 ± 1.7 (mean number of trials ± standard deviation), with a 
range from 13 to 20.
The data were analysed using linear mixed models54 implemented in the lme4 package55 in R56. We used 
deviation coding for each of our fixed effects. Our model included the fixed effects STROKING and TBS, and the 
interaction between them. The random effect in our model was participant id, with maximal random intercepts 
and slopes57. Restricted maximum likelihood estimation was used to generate the model parameters. Degrees 
of freedom for the t-statistics were approximated using the Satterthwaite method. Follow up tests on the signifi-
cant interaction effect were conducted using the emmeans package58 with Bonferroni corrected p-values and the 
Kenward-Roger method to approximate degrees of freedom.
Results
Behavioural data. The analysis on the proprioceptive measures revealed no significant differences 
[χ2(7) = 4.64, p = 0.7].
The analysis on the three statements of the questionnaire assessing ownership showed a significant main effect 
for STROKING [F(3, 118) = 30.21, p < 0.001; Fig. 2] indicating that mean values expressed for the Synchronous/
Self condition where always larger than those of the Asynchronous/Other condition. Other effects were not sig-
nificant (all p > 0.5). Therefore, as expected, the synchronous stimulation generated the illusion of ownership over 
the model hand more than the asynchronous stimulation. Moreover, the results showed that TBS did not interfere 
with the results obtained from the ownership questionnaire.
No effects or interactions were significant (all p > 0.05) in the analysis on the agency question (statement 4). 
Mean values expressed for the Synchronous/Self condition were only numerically larger than those of the 
Asynchronous/Other condition.
Agent-specific representations in the motor system. The main effect of STROKING was statisti-
cally significant (p = 0.01; Table 2), with MEPs for Asynchronous/Other generally larger than those recorded 
in the Synchronous/Self condition, whilst the main effects of TBS was not (p > 0.05). Importantly, a significant 
interaction between TBS and STROKING (p < 0.05) revealed that in the control imTBS condition the mean 
normalised MEP values were significantly larger (p < 0.01, Bonferroni corrected) in the Asynchronous/Other 
condition (0.76 ± 0.06; mean ± SE) than in the Synchronous/Self one (0.44 ± 0.07; Fig. 3). In contrast, mean 
normalised MEPs recorded after cTBS did not differ between the two stroking conditions (p = 1; Synchronous/
Self = 0.56 ± 0.07; Asynchronous/Other = 0.68 ± 0.06). Other comparisons were not statistically significant (all 
p > 0.9).
Discussion
Without an accurate sense of agency, or the feeling of control over intended self-generated movements59, people 
are unable to successfully recognise ‘who’ is the author of an observed action and may attribute movements exe-
cuted by others to themselves17. Obviously, such condition may have dramatic social effects such as compromised 
interaction and cooperation with other individuals60–64.
A great deal is known about the brain structures associated with the feeling of agency at a higher-order, con-
scious level.Over the years, brain imaging34,65–67 and repetitive TMS68 studies have consistently confirmed the role 
of the IPL in carrying out neural computations associated with the awareness of initiating a movement or with 
attributing an action to its correct agent16–20,35 (for a review, see21,22). This evidence from the healthy brain was 
also confirmed by studies carried out on brain-damaged patients: indeed, patients with IPL lesions may become 
aware of their movements only after having executed them17 or may perform movements without any conscious 
intention69. In agreement with these investigations, a particularly striking intracranial stimulation experiment22, 
conducted during awake brain surgery, showed that conscious feelings of having performed a movement, in the 
absence of any muscle contraction, can be evoked by high intensity stimulation of the left and right IPL. An oppo-
site pattern was observed when stimulating the premotor cortex, which resulted in the induction of overt motor 
responses of which the patients remained unaware. Further evidence could be found in patients suffering from 
schizophrenia, as hyper-activation of this area can determine abnormal attribution of intentions23.
Having determined which is the neural correlate of the perceived agency at a higher-order and reflective 
level, the question arises as to whether the IPL is also well suited to shape the pre-reflective experience of action 
authorship in the sensorimotor system. The evidence gathered so far indicates that it may emerge from the pre-
dictions, generated in the posterior parietal cortex, that the brain makes about the movement before action 
onset21. This model suggests that an efference copy of a motor command is sent towards the parietal cortex during 
movement execution70,71 where the prediction of the intended action is tested against the sensory and propri-
oceptive feedback1,27–29. This comparator mechanism should allow the detection, at a sensorimotor level, as to 
whether an action is self- or other-generated. Some research further suggests that these low-level agent-specific 
signals in the action system12,13,72 may support the explicit representation thereof 73. Nonetheless, the former 
were only characterised in the primary motor pathway and the question of which neurophysiological mecha-
nism shapes action attribution at the sensorimotor level remained largely unanswered. In the present work, we 
were able to confirm the causal involvement of the IPL in action authorship by demonstrating that interference 
with IPL-M1 functional interaction resulted in the disruption of self-other differentiation in the action system 
as already identified by Schütz-Bosbach and colleagues12,13. In particular, cTBS seemed to selectively interfere 
with self-related representations: a numerical facilitation (instead of an inhibition) of MEPs was recorded in the 
condition in which participants observed self-attributed actions (during synchronous stroking). This could be 
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interpreted as evidence that cTBS reduced the inhibition that the IPL exerts over the M137, which in turn may 
drive the intra-cortical inhibition and reduced facilitation measured in control conditions during the observa-
tion of self-related actions13. It is worth mentioning that our conclusion of a causal involvement of the left IPL in 
self-owned hand movements is consistent with a recent EEG experiment36 showing that transcranial alternating 
current stimulation of the left IPL reduced the activation of motor-related processes during the observation of 
hand movements from an egocentric (but not allocentric) viewpoint.
Our result triggers some other questions, such as what are the known effects of cTBS and how they could 
have influenced action attribution? Compared to classical repetitive TMS and other protocols available (for a 
review, see74), the cTBS approach induces prolonged neural inhibition at stimulated loci (>45 minutes38,75;) after 
only a short (40 sec) and low intensity stimulation consisting of 600 stimuli. At stimulation intensity of 80% of 
the active motor threshold, cTBS produces a decrease of intracortical excitability51 that has been associated with 
long-term depression (LTD)-like mechanisms38,76. Accordingly, it appears reasonable that cTBS of IPL could drop 
the firing of the excitatory parietal-motor projections (non-local cortico-cortical projection are glutamatergic) 
originating from the IPL, which are known to inhibit the ipsilateral M137 through the ventral premotor cortex77. 
Indeed, anatomical studies, DTI tractography and analysis of the strength of connectivity77–81 reveal that the 
IPL is extensively connected with the ventral premotor cortex by different bundles of the superior longitudinal 
fasciculus, whilst only sparse connections are found with M1. In turn, the ventral premotor cortex plays as a 
relay in the parietal-to-motor network connecting IPL to M1. As a matter of fact, cTBS to this area disrupts the 
parietal-motor connectivity77.
The recent work by Karabanov and colleagues82 further demonstrates that the parietal-to-motor inhibition, 
which is observed at rest37, is preserved when people experience ownership over a moving rubber hand but not 
when they lack this illusory experience. This is consistent with the present findings for both TBS paradigms. While 
the mean MEP values for the Synchronous/Self condition were significantly lower than in the Asynchronous/Other 
after imTBS, cTBS of the IPL impaired agent differentiation in the motor system as indicated by a lack of a difference 
between the mean MEPs for the two condition. More precisely, cTBS seemed to selectively facilitate the illusorily 
self-attributed actions, when compared to the homologous condition in imTBS. We could therefore argue that cTBS 
of IPL affected the GABAergic inhibitory circuits, at the level of local interneurons within the primary motor cor-
tex13,83,84, as well as the reduced facilitation associated with actions attributed to the self12,13. We believe that our 
approach demonstrates the IPL’s role in differentiating the self from the other at the sensorimotor level and provides 
reliable evidence of the causal functional interactions between the IPL and M1 in action authorship, although we 
cannot substantiate any information about the anatomical pathways that might mediate it.
It is worth noting, however, that IPL stimulation had no impact on the successful induction of the RHI, as 
assessed from the first three statements of the questionnaire, indicating that the stimulation did not affect the 
experience of ownership over the model’s limb. Moreover, we found that the ratings regarding the experience of 
agency (statement 4) did neither differ across the experimental conditions nor across the pre-post comparison, 
suggesting that our modified version of the RHI paradigm did not induce illusionary experience of control (i.e., 
agency) over the observed movements in a passive observer but impact the experience of owner- and authorship 
(i.e. self-other attribution) of the observed action only (for the conceptual distinction between agency and own-
ership see e.g.85,86.
Figure 2. Means and standard errors of the RHI questionnaire assessing the ownership of the observed hand in 
the different experimental conditions.
Estimate SE df t p
Intercept 0.62 0.21 15 2.99 0.009
Stroking 0.19 0.06 14.81 2.95 0.01
TBS 0.04 0.15 14.95 0.27 0.79
Stroking * 
TBS 0.3 0.14 14.93 2.18 0.046
Table 2. Results of the Linear Mixed Model. Significant effects are highlighted in bold.
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However, it is important to note that the present study does unfortunately not allow to draw any strong con-
clusions about the potential relation between the differential response pattern at the level of the primary motor 
cortex and the phenomenological experience of hand/action authorship as assessed by the Rubber-hand illusion 
questionnaire, since we assessed illusionary experiences only once after each experimental block. Future studies 
should therefore consider to use a trial-by-trial assessment of illusionary experience to predict corticospinal excit-
ability, respectively and vice versa73 and in this way further proof the validity of the neurophysiological response 
as a proxy of explicit sensations of movements and judgements of self-other attribution.
As far as the proprioceptive drift is concerned, we found no statistically significant results. Its absence may 
be due to TMS-induced muscle twitches, necessarily induced in an MEP study, that have already been shown to 
affect the drift measure (for similar arguments see12). Another explanation may be related to a cTBS-induced 
disruption of visuo-tactile integration87 that may have modulated the perceptual drift while leaving the subjective 
ownership ratings intact. Such an occurrence has been shown on various occasions previously88–90. Failure of 
recalibrating the limb in the RHI was also associated with motor symptoms in dystonia, in which the experience 
of the illusion was again retained91. This points to the direction of a failure in the integration of visual-tactile input 
with the proprioceptive information in order to update the body part position. In other words, one could argue 
that cTBS introduced a conflict that affected the perceived synchronicity of brush-stroking of the participant’s 
and the model’s fingers during the RHI. Whether this interfered with the sensorimotor representation of self- and 
other-related actions, while leaving the ownership feeling intact, is unclear. Reduced drift has also been reported 
in autism spectrum disorder when individuals were involved in a grasping task under the effects of the RHI92. In 
this work, Paton and colleagues92 observed that healthy subjects were facilitated in their action when they were 
in the other condition compared to the self one. In patients, the pattern was reversed: the authors measured a 
facilitation for the self condition, probably due to a self-oriented behaviour (less representation of the other). 
Interesting, individuals with autism also display atypical patterns of corticospinal excitability during action obser-
vation93, such as lower modulation of M1 excitability94, reduced MEP facilitation95 and cortical inhibition defi-
cits96. This atypical patterns of self–other representations may lead to reduced social abilities97 and may depend 
on anomalies of the IPL, such as reduced thickness that was associated to this disorder98.
In conclusion, we argue that changes in parietal-motor connectivity modulate action authorship at the senso-
rimotor level. On the one hand, our work gives further experimental support to models of action authorship as 
emerging from neural computations carried out in the parietal cortex19,99. On the other hand, it identifies the IPL 
as the provider of core information necessary for social differentiation at the sensorimotor level. Future studies 
will need to better characterise this neuropsychological processing and explore its impact on fronto-parietal defi-
cits such as with schizophrenia and autism100.
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